

The Face of Things

Dedicated to the memory of my father

During the early summer of 1984 Richard Deacon made a sculpture to which he gave the title *On the Face of It*. Blue-grey sack cloth sags from a galvanized steel structure in the shape of a question-mark with a humped, elongated tail. This structure rests on the ground on two points, the curved surface of the question-mark's hook, and the foot of the tail which slopes gently downwards. The sack cloth is sewn in such a way that it is gathered at two points between which pleats bag down loosely from their arched support. The steel is rivetted using tabs of the same material to form three sides of a box section, giving structural rigidity. With its contrast of hard, crystalline steel and soft, rust-stained fabric, this sculpture draws attention to the facticity of its materials. Yet even the most literal description cannot avoid metaphor. The sculpture is restrained and straightforward in its use of materials but, without our quite knowing why or how, it invites us to 'see things' in it. The material covers and conceals its support like clothing on a body and, with its gatherings, a 'leg of mutton' sleeve or a flowing Victorian dress from which peeks a tantalizing glimpse of ankle, the rivetted steel foot. The hook of the question-mark, then, becomes an arm resting on its elbow, or the outline of a face. The curved steel under the cloth is like a bending spine. Before our eyes an object made from a workday material and a dirty piece of cloth is transformed into something 'rich and strange' while never for a moment losing its identity as 'stuff'.

The title is an idiomatic phrase as apparently ordinary as the object; but its use as the name for a sculpture brings the metaphor latent within it to life. The face is a part of the body which is not concealed by clothing, and to which we look for expression, an outward sign of the inner life. However all that we actually see of the face, as of the sculpture, is surface, sur-face meaning literally 'on the face'. But we know there is more to 'It' than that. Between skin or clothing and skeleton there is muscle, blood, internal organs, everything necessary for life. The steel element of the sculpture supports the fabric like a skeleton, but looking down the 'neck' we can see that inside there is only empty darkness between skin and bone. The sculpture carries evidence, on its surface, of the processes of fabrication, rivetting and sewing, by which it has been made; modes of production which, because they are not usually associated with art, draw attention to its place in the wider social world which cannot be immediately visible. Finally, the title, and the associations which we bring to our interpretation of the sculpture, acknowledge the role of language in its disclosure.

It may seem audacious to compare *On the Face of It* with Bernini's *Ecstasy of St. Teresa*: the mundane with the extraordinary, the modern with the baroque, the restrained with the theatrical. But, turning from the Deacon to the Bernini, I saw St.

Teresa's foot, emerging from the lush folds of her habit, as it were for the first time. And perhaps this little act of voyeurism, so much a part of the latent sexuality of the Bernini, reveals the nakedness of the steel foot which peeks from beneath the sacking in Deacon's sculpture, which also reminds us that the drapery of *On the Face of It* is a variation on a sculptural theme of which Bernini's work is the supreme exemplar; the difference being that Bernini makes stone look like cloth, whereas Deacon's drapery *is* cloth. Bernini's sculpture is a *mimesis*, stone is made to resemble drapery, flesh, hair, the wings of the angel; whereas Deacon's sculpture is both literal and, when we, for example, see a body in it, metaphorical. But then look at the support for the figures in the Bernini: it is undeniably stone, engrained with the marks of the chisel, which we are invited to see as a cushion of cloud. And *The Ecstasy of St. Teresa* as a whole is a metaphor for what cannot possibly be represented, the warm yellow light from a concealed window irradiates the sculpture, stone brought to life, as a metaphor for infusion of Divine Grace in the mystical union with God, the Infinite which overflows the bounds of substance.

Empathy and Otherness

Richard Deacon's sculpture of the mid-70s can be seen as an attempt to instigate a changing perceptual experience through three dimensions while at the same time preventing the object being read in terms of part-to-part relationships,¹ a preoccupation which distinguishes his constructions from the tradition of welded sculpture descended in Britain from Anthony Caro. The concern with facticity and wholeness is akin to the literalist aesthetic of American Minimal art. Donald Judd asserted in an interview of 1966, 'The whole's it. The big problem is to maintain the sense of the whole thing . . . the big problem is that anything that is not absolutely plain begins to have parts in some way. The thing is to be able to work and do different things and yet not break up the wholeness that a piece has.' And he also argued against an idealist view of art inherent, as he saw it, in the European approach to compositional relationships,

'All that art is based on systems built beforehand, *a priori* systems; they express a certain type of thinking and logic that is pretty much discredited now as a way of finding out what the world's like.'² Between 1966 and 1971 Robert Morris published an influential series of articles in *Artforum* in which he described an approach to making sculpture based on the inherent behaviour of materials and a phenomenology of the body. Rosalind Krauss has argued that the art of the Minimalists amounted to a culmination of the movement in modern sculpture, beginning with Rodin, to relocate the point of origin of the body's meaning from its core to its surface, and that it did so through 'a vocabulary of form that is radically abstract'.³ This involved the refutation of the idea of an 'inside' from which meaning and structure originate: these are henceforth to be derived in and through experience. The theoretical framework is provided partly by Wittgenstein's rejection of a view of language based on an inherent connection between words and things for a conception

of meaning based on use, and partly by the phenomenology of Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty's assertion of the primacy of the experience of the body in his book *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945, trans. 1962). These ideas, exemplified, for Krauss, by the Minimalists' approach to art, also play a part in Deacon's sculpture, notably in the self-evidence of the

fabrication process; the use of skin to define an interior which is hollow, this inside not the source of the structure which is co-extensive with the surface; and the striving to achieve an object which will be apprehended as whole and 'other'.

However, if the strength of Minimalism lay in its phenomenological conception of experience, so did its weakness. For the pursuit of the 'literal' object through the unmediated, 'primordial' experience of the body was bound, in the end, to prove reductive. The stress, particularly in the work of Judd, on the sculpture as an object among other

things in the world was an important development. But its potential remained limited without an articulation of the sociality of objects within the interpersonal realm, and an appreciation of the metaphorical nature of language which plays a part in even the most immediate perception of things.

Minimalism required the elimination of illusion so that the object itself would be wholly present. In his writings of the mid-70S the British sculptor William Tucker reasserted the part played by illusion in the perception and meaning of sculpture: 'it is the central task of sculpture now *to represent space* ... in the literal sense of *re-presenting* a particular spatial experience, using *present* space, with its given, known, qualities as the medium. . . . The represented space of the sculpture is thus both an interpretation of space in general, and simultaneously an interpretation of *space as an instrument of feeling*' (his italics). This re-presentation of real space as illusion has to do with the 'central paradox' of sculpture: 'that it is at once a thing in the world, with us, an object among objects - and yet privileged, set apart, withdrawn'.⁴ The autonomy of the sculpture is a condition of its disclosure within experience as subject to gravity and revealed by light. Tucker's own contribution to *The Condition of Sculpture*, an international survey exhibition at the Hayward Gallery which he selected in 1975, was a large work, in laminated hardboard and steel, called *Tunnel*. A curved skin of wood arches over a supporting rectangle to make a dark, interior space, the stressed curve weighted down by a planar sheet on the other side. The large scale -over two metres in height - prompts an architectural reading: the viewer, moving around the sculpture, is successively invited to project an entry into the interior void and excluded by the barrier of the laminated sheets. The sculpture sets up a tension between above and below, foreground and background, inside and outside and, most of all, a tension in the experience of the viewer between inclusion and exclusion. The acknowledgement of the literalist otherness of the object is augmented by the spatial and projective experience of empathy.

'Empathy' is a translation of the German word *Ein-fuhlung* with literally means 'feeling of oneness'. The term was used in aesthetics to describe an inner participation in a foreign experience or object with which the ego, the body or the 'will to activity' identifies.⁵ Empathy requires that the distance between the experiencing subject and the object be both eradicated and maintained.

In Deacon's sculpture this distance is preserved by actual space and by an assertion of the material facticity of the object. The large scale of the four sculptures Deacon made during 1980-81 after his return from the USA renders them almost obstructive. Their facticity is emphasized by the evidence of the process of fabrication - glue squeezed out from between the timbers, the rivets which join the steel sheets - and its obdurate repetitiveness. However, these fabrication processes also contribute to the encouragement of empathy: the stressing of materials into curved forms suggests a dynamism with which the body identifies, similarly, for example, to the way in which on entering a Gothic cathedral we feel an upward thrust which defies the weight of stone, or identify with the movements of a dancer;⁶ and the organic, biomorphic shapes, by contrast with the rectilinear, grid-like structures characteristic of Minimal art, call forth this response 'for the simple reason that the sinuous line has a far stronger appeal to our need for empathy than the straight line', as Worringer wrote.'

If the surface is what we actually perceive, empathy presupposes that the other has an interior, whether this be conceived as an actual volume, or an inner life of experience and feeling with which to identify. This could be correlated with a notion of structure as a centre which determines the exterior, like the skeleton in a body, or the idea as that which gives form to matter. In Deacon's sculpture there is no inner armature: surface and structure are co-extensive. And there is no solid volume in which form is to be discovered and brought forth: rather, the interior defined by the skin is hollow. The movement of empathy, instigated by spatial illusion and organic form which conveys the sense of constant renewal and becoming, is not allowed to result in the projection of a hidden inwardness as the origin of the exterior.

In the first of the large untitled sculptures of 1980, the use of laminated strips of timber, because there are no corners to mark the joins, allowed Deacon to make an object which would be read as a whole without part-to-part relationships. Structure and surface, shape and image coincide. At the same time, the literal structure defines a virtual space which changes as the viewer walks around the object. Facing the more open side, a number of undulating struts begin at the outline of a pear-shape aperture and appear to extend outwards until, supported by a laminated circle, they terminate pointing slightly upwards and inwards, as if in a gathering movement; the viewer might be reminded of a container if the linear structure is taken as defining an interior volume. While the aperture is larger at this side than at the other, the termination of the struts pointing at the

viewer introduces an element of aggressivity, and discourages any inclination towards the physical access which is perceptually invited. From the other side of the sculpture, the teardrop-shaped opening is smaller and bounded by a rim which touches the ground. While from the wider side the sculpture appeared to open out towards the viewer, from this side it appears to recede. Coupled with these perceptual experiences are a variety of image-connotations all of which are thoroughly embedded *in* the structure: they include a basket, a blossoming flower, and a woman's sex. Opposing this perceptual and associative 'appropriation' of the sculpture is its extreme physicality - the texture of the wood and the oozing glue between the laminates. This indicates that it is a made thing absolutely other to the viewer, an impression which co-exists with the tendency to consume and project which the sculpture also invites.

The image-references and associations of the sculpture are inseparable from its phenomenological performance and structural behaviour. This is also true of the second of the *Untitled* sculptures: a cone of rivetted galvanized steel sheet with apertures at each end which are angled so that they form ellipses facing the same side of the cone. These apertures are lipped in different ways: one inwards from the outer surface, with concrete used to make a gradual transition from exterior to interior and lend a thickness to the walls; and the other with a rim graduating from pointing inwards at the extreme end to outwards at the near side; in the latter rim the hinges joining it to the main body are evident, and in the former they are concealed. These details bear witness to a concern with the rim as the mediation between exterior and interior, the known and the concealed, divided and defined by the steel skin. As the viewer walks around the sculpture the larger aperture appears to open like a mouth to consume the whole sculpture. As the other side of the sculpture is reached, all point of entry is concealed, and the viewer is confronted with a curved metal facade that acts like a shield or a barrier. Conical form and riveted metal suggest an engineering structure, like the fuselage of an aircraft, especially from the back. From the other side the associations are of a musical instrument such as a trumpet, and body parts, ear, mouth and eye - things not associated with the material and fabrication, setting up a discrepancy between facticity and an associative reading.

The Heart's in the Right Place combines the characteristics of the two modes of the untitled sculptures: the reflective surface of steel with the linear definition of an inferred volume which is, in actuality, empty. The curved beams of galvanized steel are joined at each end of the sculpture's length by a small circle. They are held apart by a steel element which defines, as the outline of the central section, a heart. Following the metaphor, we could see the steel elements as the ribs of a rib cage; in addition, the lateral section which bisects the 'heart' at the dip forms the outline of the upper and lower lips of a mouth. The substance of the sculpture is all surface; we can look through it as well as at it. But the heart, as a metaphor for the 'inner' life

of feelings by which and with which we empathize, does not depend upon the notion of a hidden interior.

Metaphor, Resonance and the Ear

There are two levels on which metaphor operates in Richard Deacon's sculpture. The first is that of image-reference in individual works: these images exceed and refer beyond the literal facticity of the sculpture. The second level, which incorporates the first, is that of what could be termed meta-metaphor: metaphors which operate across a number of works and concern the sculpture's ontology, its mode of production and its reception. The first level involves the meanings of individual sculptures, the second the way in which sculpture as a practice attains meaning, the basis or first metaphor upon which it is founded.

So far I have discussed Deacon's sculpture in terms of a contrast between empathy and otherness as they arise in the experience of the object. In 1977 Deacon wrote an essay on a painting by Poussin, *Landscape with a Man Killed by a Snake* (National Gallery, London) in which he discussed the relation between representation and the experience of spatial illusion. Deacon distinguishes between 'looking at', which pays attention to the medium and the work of art as a whole, and 'looking for' which extracts representations on the basis of association.⁸ This distinction is based on a discussion of representational seeing by the philosopher Richard Wollheim where he replaces the notion of seeing the medium of representation *as* the object or what is represented, with seeing what is represented *in* the medium.⁹ Most importantly, this allows simultaneous attention to medium and representation, as well as the possibility of multiple representation, which need not be particulars but can also be states of affairs, in the same medium. The difference between Wollheim's distinction and Deacon's is that the latter's is exclusive, reflecting perhaps the non-representational character of his art at this point, while in the former 'seeing-as' is subsumed under the more extended concept of 'seeing-in'. Both arguments stem from the account of 'seeing an aspect' in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. Using the example of the figure which can be seen as the head of a rabbit or of a duck, he writes,

'The change of aspect. "But surely you would say that the picture is altogether different now!" But what is different: my impression? my point of view? — Can I say? I *describe* the alteration like a perception: quite as if the object had altered before my eyes.'¹⁰

Wittgenstein's notes on 'seeing an aspect' arose in the context of a discussion of language, and much of the debate in art theory during the late 60s and early 70s concerned the relation between art and language. For both, language is conceived within epistemology, as a condition for a communicable knowledge of the world and of art. Metaphor, however, which is characterized by a deviation from 'proper' or univocal meaning, raises the question of ontology, or the condition of being, which is why the tradition of epistemology has segregated metaphor as the province of

literature. Metaphor sets up a contradiction within a current conceptual framework: either this can be resolved by a restructuring of the framework, as in the case of the emergence of innovative concepts in science and other fields;¹¹ or it can lead to a reorientation which exceeds the conceptual and concerns the coming into being of meaning and its status. In this instance, metaphor is inherent in the very medium of thought, as for example, in the metaphorical language of Nietzsche and the later Heidegger. Jacques Derrida has argued that the notion of truth as unmediated transparency or presence is itself founded on metaphor, principally the metaphor of light or illumination.¹² This would mean that literalist art, concerned as it is with the immediate presence of the object in its facticity, is irredeemably metaphorical. During 1978-79, the year which he spent in the USA, Deacon made a series of drawings entitled collectively *It's Orpheus When There's Singing*, after the fifth of the *Sonnets to Orpheus* by Rilke which he was reading at the time. In his notebooks he described the process by which they were made:

'These drawings commence from a geometric figures. A spiral links points on the figure. A series of arcs and curves partially tied to the spiral, is sprung off various points inside and outside the figure. The development of these curves builds up a network or ground against which specific shapes are allowed to emerge.' and he added later,

'The drawings are intentionally extremely representational. I have difficulty in deciding of what they are representations. This concerns their reference. I have difficulty corroborating their reference with something. Except I have considered *Sonnets to Orpheus* as their subject.'¹³

These drawings are not representations of something already in the world, like a still life, nor are they expressive in the sense of externalizing something, a feeling or an image, from 'within' the artist. It is important that they refer to something which is already a work of art for their subject, and, moreover, a work of literature. They do so not in any sense to illustrate that work: it would be absolutely wrong to see the drawings and some subsequent sculptures as dependent upon Rilke's poems in the way that an illustration depends upon its text, indeed these works can be adequately understood without any prior acquaintance with the poetry. Rather, Rilke enabled Deacon to see how a certain conception of the relation between language, world and being could inform the practice of art, above all through the use of metaphor both within the work and as the basis for its ontology.

The drawings carry the evidence, of the rule-bound operations which produced them, an incorporation of their means of production which places them within the context of literalist art. But these apparently impersonal, geometric operations produced figures which were recognized as referring to something in addition to the facticity of the marks, seen as 'aspects' in the Wittgensteinian sense; a recognition which is activated not by a verification of truth by comparison, but by language. Not only does language furnish a field of reference, so that we could say that the subsequent

sculpture becomes meaningful at the intersection of object and language, but it also provides the basis upon which things come to mean.

His reading of the poetry of Rilke allowed Deacon to replace the subject-object dichotomy with a conception of both encompassed by Being or *Dasein*.¹¹ Thus we can understand the title of the drawings, *It's Orpheus When There's Singing*, in terms of a phrase from the third sonnet, *Gesang ist Dasein*, 'song is being'. It is said in the myth that Orpheus' song enchanted wild beasts and made the trees and rocks move from their places to follow the sound of his music; and that after his body had been torn apart by the Maenads his head and lyre floated, still singing and playing, down the river Hebrus to the sea and thence to Lesbos. In its resonance, in the way that it is both inside and outside, crossing the distance between subject and things, music is a metaphor for Being; lyric poetry, of which Orpheus is the patron, is language as music. Rilke's *Sonnets* are concerned with the way in which ordinary things, from the indifference of which the subject might feel alienated, become meaningful in language. This meaning, or truth, is not a correlation of the percept or idea with things outside: it is founded in the language which constitutes both.

In the first part (1903) of *The Rodin Book*, Rilke asserted the autonomy of sculpture once it became detached from the wall,

'It was something which could exist for its own sake alone, and it was well to give it absolutely the character of an object around which one could pass and which could be observed from all sides. And yet, it must in some way be distinguished from other things, ordinary things, which anyone may lay hold of. . . It must be fitted into the surrounding air as into a niche and thus be given a security, a sublimity due to its simple existence and not to its significance.' The autonomy of the work of art for Rilke was not a matter of 'art for art's sake' or with the perception of internal relationships as in a formalist aesthetic; it was to enable the apprehension of the way things *are* which is not attended to in our utilitarian dealings with the world. By the time of the second part (1907) of the book, Rilke has modified his conception: ordinary things can themselves take on the resonance of the work of art, 'Things.

'When I say that word (do you hear?), there is a silence; the silence which surrounds things. All movement subsides and becomes contour, and out of past and future time something permanent is formed: space, the great calm of objects which know no urge.' Things, of which we see the surface, are meaningful because they are *said*; and that saying, as a bringing of the object to being, is allied with making, 'For the endowment of an object with life of its own does not depend on great ideas but upon whether out of such ideas one can create a *metier*, a daily labour, something that remains with one to the end.'¹⁵

In this light we can understand the repetitiveness of the processes which Deacon uses - gluing, rivetting, stitching - as allying the bringing into being of the sculpture with the making of ordinary things. Once the object is made, it becomes a thing apart. Rilke imagines this happening for the first time: 'it must have been a strange

experience to see the made object as a recognized existence, with the same rights and the same reality as the thing already there ... no sooner was it finished and put aside than it took its place among other things, assumed their indifference, their quiet dignity, and looked on, as it were, from a distance. . . .' The way that Deacon's sculpture is other has, as we have seen, to do with its occupation of space as distance. There is also its relation to the ground upon which we, and other things, also stand.

The removal of the plinth in modern sculpture rendered its difference from other things equivocal. Even if, in the end, the gallery came to serve as a frame, the relation of the sculpture to its horizontal support remained one of the sources of its status as an object, both in terms of how it was to be experienced; and, as the sculpture was unlikely to be actually confused with other things, in terms of its metaphorical relation to them. The way in which Deacon's sculpture sits on the ground is in sharp contrast to that of the Minimalist cube which is like a block or box. Most of Deacon's sculptures, from as early as 1976, rest in stable equilibrium on a curved edge. This has the effect of rendering their placement incidental and yet at the same time dynamically achieved: in avoiding the impression of arrangement which the installation of a cubic sculpture in a cubic room inevitably evokes, this both allies Deacon's sculptures with the characteristically incidental placement of 'ordinary' things, and precludes any infringement of the autonomy of the sculpture as an object which is whole.

The shapes produced in the drawings most often resemble the outline of pots, of which the fundamental characteristic is a surface or skin separating inside and outside, the contained space from the continuum beyond.¹⁶ In the subsequent sculpture, the linear structure of laminate or the steel skin also defines a contained space, and the imagery is extended to include various references to sound: mouth, ear and trumpet in the second untitled work, and in the third a contour which suggest both a pot, and an inverted head with circular ears at each side. If we are reminded of the disembodied head of Orpheus, we can begin to understand how the central metaphor of Rilke's *Sonnets* has been carried over into the sculpture. The poem is, literally, sound which, like Orpheus' song, is capable of animating things by disclosing them within *Dasein*. In an earlier poem, *Am Rande der Nacht*, Rilke had written, . . . *Ich bin eine Sacke, I iiber rauschende breite I Resonanzen gespannt. I Die Dinge sind Geigenleiber*, '. . . I am a string / strung over wide, roaring resonances. / Things are hollow violins'. In a poem which is actual sound the reference to space is a metaphor for the clearing, or 'Open' as Rilke calls it elsewhere, where the disclosure of Being takes place.¹⁷ Since the sculpture is a literal thing in actual space, a *chiasmus* or inversion is necessary, so it is now the references to sound which stand in a metaphorical relation to the resonance of *Dasein*.

With its steel bow and circular aperture leading to an interior hollow, the fourth of the sculptures Deacon made after his return from the USA could be seen as a large

musical instrument ready to resonate with sound. It is the most condensed in reference so far: the upper plate of galvanized steel makes an ear-shape while rising up from the ground is a huge tongue; the corrugated steel around the outside suggests a skirt or a hat, angled so that the form of the sculpture changes dramatically on circumambulation. This condensation and displacement of images is in accord with the mechanisms of Freud's 'dream work';¹⁸ and the combination of strange and unexpected disjunctions of scale with prosaic material is analogous to the combination of the bizarre and the ordinary in fairy tales, an impression confirmed by the title, 7/ *the Shoe Fits*, which refers to the tale of Cinderella - whomsoever the shoe fits the prince will marry. But the shoe in this case is not a glass slipper but a large steel structure, closer to the scale of Old Mother Hubbard's home - the surface of which is pierced with uncomfortably sharp-pointed screws. These serve not only to measure the expenditure of work in the making of the piece and anchor it in the ordinary by stressing the facticity of surface, but also punctuate it in a way which is slightly hostile to the touch, yet another assertion of otherness. This was the first sculpture to which Deacon gave a title, and as always in his work, it is much more than just a label. The tendency in Minimalism was to leave works untitled, or to give them a title for convenience such as a numeral or prosaic description. Deacon's titles acknowledge the way in which language constitutes a 'world' and guides our apprehension of the things in it. As Rilke asserted, it is 'saying' or naming which brings things, otherwise inert and indifferent, into Being, the human being-there of *Dasein*. The titles don't so much add an interpretation to the sculpture which would otherwise be missed, as make manifest the way in which the sculpture, as a made and perceived thing, is *already* in language. Just as the fabrication processes and materials of the sculpture are 'ordinary' and used outside art, so the titles are vernacular idioms; and in the same way as the resulting sculpture is metaphorical, so the use of these idiomatic phrases as titles reawakens the metaphors lying dormant within them.

Language is necessarily interpersonal and social: it is one of the ways in which we are with other people; in naming something, we name it for the other. After // *the Shoe Fits* Deacon began a series of smaller works to which he continues to add, and which bears the collective title *Art for Other People*. Art, like language, is always 'for other people'; in this case the title draws attention to the relation of the smaller, domestic scale of most of these objects to the things in people's homes, and to the use of household materials and processes. Deacon's introduction of linoleum and sewn fabric and leather coincides with Tony Cragg's use of found plastic fragments and Bill Woodrow's cutting of facsimile images out of discarded domestic products, different ways of asserting that art is a *social* language, although Cragg and Woodrow are more concerned with consumerism than Deacon.¹⁹ In Deacon's case, linoleum provided a means of creating a literal surface-skin with a coloured pattern which was also an *ersatz* imitation of another

substance; a use of art in the ordinary and the ordinary in art which breaks down the hierarchical distinction between fine art and decoration.

The earlier concern with inside and outside, container and contained, skin and structure is continued and developed in the *Art for Other People* series; for example, *Art for Other People No. 4* is perceived as a unitary torpedo-shaped 'skin' of black fabric from the outside, while from the aperture at one end the blackness is the void of the interior. The theme of 'resonance' is pursued through metaphors of mouth and ear and musical instruments: the curved and straight conical horns of *No. 2*; the bagpipe-like leather sack with sheet-brass linear structure of *No. 6*; the mouth and ear, like the handpiece of a telephone, joined by a tube of linoleum in *No. 7*; the harlequin-check linoleum and steel 'trumpet' passing through a steel mouth/eye shape in *No. 11*. The very first of the series, subtitled *The Singer*, a twopart sculpture consisting of a carved stone 'jug' facing the opening of a stitched leather sleeve, recalls the dog with its ear cocked beside a gramophone horn on the His Master's Voice record labels, among many other associations.²⁰ The comparatively small scale of the *Art for Other People* sculptures allowed an experimentation with materials and iconography which has in turn informed the larger work.

Deacon chose biblical quotations for the titles of *For Those Who Have Eyes* and *For Those Who Have Ears*; it seems obvious that sculpture, like the good child, is seen but not heard. But consider *For Those Who Have Ears No. 2*, where the laminated wood strips define a curvilinear contour which can be read in different ways: as ear-shapes, as breasts, as a harp (the national instrument of Wales where the sculpture was first shown) or as the outline of a lyre, Orpheus' instrument and the Romantic symbol of creativity since the lyre is played by Nature as the wind passes through its strings. These are all aspects which are not literally 'there' in the laminated wood: a phenomenology of vision alone cannot bring them into being, therefore they must be 'heard' by 'those who have ears' to receive, as it were, the Word. *Tall Tree in the Ear* explores the relation of silhouette and volume, image and materiality, *logos* and substance.

The 'ear' is a tall silhouette covered with rumpled blue canvas. This element is supported by a steel tripod whose three symmetrical arms swell towards the bottom, giving a sense of biomorphic fullness to the volume described, like a ripe fruit, a pear for instance. It is the ear which is 'tall' and the fruit which is a metonymic substitute for the tree. The title comes from the first of Rilke's *Sonnets to Orpheus*,

There rose a tree. O pure transcendancy!

O Orpheus singing! O tall tree in the ear!

And all was silent. Yet even in the silence
new beginning, beckoning, change appear.

(trans. Herter Norton)

The rising of the tree is indicated by the tallness of the ear while the blue of the fabric, the colour of the sky and of the Symbolist *reve*, could be taken as symbolic of

transcendence. The crumpling of the fabric has the dual effect of dematerial-izing the solidity of the 'ear' when seen from afar, while stressing the surface of the fabric from close up. Similarly, the tripod 'fruit' is comprised of rigid galvanized steel, with its crystalline surface which is dematerialized by the reflection of ambient light. As the viewer walks around the sculpture the outline of the ear disappears and reappears, while the 'fruit' maintains a constant inferred volume.

There is more to the 'trancendency' of this sculpture than its symbolization. The oxymoron of the title draws attention to the part played by discourse in the 'becoming' of the sculpture in the viewer's active apprehension, *logos* immanent in bodily and visual perception as it changes through time, an interlacing of the visible and the invisible. Not only does the sculpture invite inference to complete both emblem and volume, but it also refers to the word as its subject which is nothing less than the blossoming of meaning. As Heidegger has written, 'Language is the flower of the mouth. In language the earth blossoms toward the bloom of the sky.'²¹

Visibility, Voyeurism and the Eye

In one of his seminars the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan tells the story of a time when he was on a boat with some Breton fishermen. One of them pointed to a sardine can floating on the water and glittering in the sun. 'You see that can? Do you see it? Well, it doesn't see you!', he says to the young intellectual. Lacan reflects on this,

'... if what Petit-Jean said to me, namely, that the can did not see me, had any meaning, it was because in a sense it was looking at me, all the same. It was looking at me at the level of the point of light, the point at which everything that looks at me is situated - and I am not speaking metaphorically.' This glimmering metal can is like a trap to catch what Lacan calls 'the gaze'. Reversing the conventional terms of perspective and Cartesian philosophy in which the world exists for and in relation to the conscious ego, Lacan suggests that there is a split between the eye which looks and the gaze which is a 'showing' whereby the world looks back at the viewer. When we are fascinated by something which we see we speak of being 'rivetted'; it is in this sense of being transfixed that the gaze makes itself felt, and constitutes the position of the viewer as a divided, conscious and unconscious, subject.²²

This return of the look by its object is explored in the group of sculptures by Deacon through which runs the metaphor of the eye. In the essay on Toussin's *Landscape with a Man Killed by a Snake* Deacon wrote concerning one of the figures that 'The gaze of the man remains fixed on the scene both caught (fascinated) and holding off (distancing - the eye is the prime means of placing objects in space, at a distance - cf. pornography and erotica).' Duchamp illustrated the mechanism of voyeurism in his last sculpture, *Etant Donnes*, where through a hole in a door the viewer sees the naked torso of a woman holding a lamp, which could be read as a displacement of

the phallus, the lack of which is revealed by the sight of her sex. It is this absent but displaced phallus (for which the lamp is a metaphor) which illuminates the scene.²³ The reflectivity of the strips of stainless steel sheet of Deacon's *For Those Who Have Eyes* emphasizes that it is the play of light which is the condition of its visibility.

Seen from the side, the sculpture resembles a huge light-bulb, or perhaps, referring back to Orpheus, a disembodied head. Like Brancusi's polished bronze heads, it gives back the world as reflection, mirroring its environment. Seen large end on, the lateral strips join to make a circular void, the iris of an eye-ball. So the sculpture is not only mirror and lamp, traditional paradigms of mimesis and Romantic meaning-infusing subjectivity, but also the hollow body which makes a place of space, and the eye of vision. In its scale, at the structural limit of the material the sculpture makes a cage. This cage is large enough for a body, but the body is excluded by the bars, so it is the gaze which is trapped, attracted by the fascinating allure of reflected light, caught in the central void. Comparing Deacon's sculpture *Two Can Play with For Those Who Have Eyes*, we are led to read it as a doubled eye, or two eye-balls, and between them a slit like a trap ready to snap shut and enclose the voyeur-victim in its double cage. This view of the sculpture is, however, undermined by the transparency of its structure. To lend rigidity the strips of galvanized steel are joined to make 'L-beams', and the L is inverted from one sphere to the other: so from any point of view it is possible to see exactly how the sculpture was made.

In the third of the 'eye' sculptures, the eye-form, made from interlaced stainless steel strips, is more object-like because smaller, more of a 'thing' set at a distance than a structure which invites empathy. This 'eye' has a beaten brass-iris attached to its front, and attached to its open end a pair of grey herringbone trouser legs joined to make a 'tail'. Like the *Singer (Art for Other People No. i)* this sculpture consists of two separate parts. The second is a slightly flattened metal 'bin' with a cone of latticed wooden slats opening out from the aperture, as if to receive the 'eye' into a hole which would in actuality prove too small for it. With its trouser-leg tail the eye also connotes a tadpole or a sperm which would make the receptacle a uterine passage. The title of the sculpture is *The Eye Has It*. In a sense this is contradicted by the sculpture: the eye might 'consume' what it sees, but as tadpole/sperm, it looks more like it is about to be consumed, just as the viewer is absorbed or fascinated by the object of the look. As speech rather than writing, the 'Eye' of the title is a pun on the T or ego: like all Deacon's sculpture, this work is about the 'IV' relation to the world. Finally, 'Eye' is also a pun on 'Aye', the affirmative, as in the parliamentary dictum 'The Ayes have it'.

In each of these sculptures, an apprehension of the object based on the eye, on its availability to the voyeuristic gaze, is confronted by the necessity to acknowledge that the making of it involved the labour of the hand. The world, this implies, is not only looked at, but also transformed. This enters into our consideration of space,

which is both the distance which separates us from the things at which we look, and the site in which our bodies move and work.

Deacon has written,

'It can, perhaps, be said about visual perception that one's experience of the world fluctuates between that of flatness and that of depth. The paradigm for such fluctuations lies in the relation between hand and eye, between seeing and touching. I tend to the belief that such issues (the operations and contents of our perceptions) are central to considerations of the ways in which we conduct ourselves in the world and form our relations with objects and with others. In particular that a confusion between flatness and depth, invitation and rebuttal, characterises our dealings with the world.'²⁴

Appearance and Disappearance

When we look in a mirror, what we see reflected back at us is an image of our own body. In Deacon's *Mirror Mirror*, the shape of a large hand-mirror is outlined in laminated wood, so we look through it to the actual space behind, and not at a reflection of a virtual space. Rising up in the centre of this void is a loop of laminated wood, as if a reflection were literally 'in' the mirror. The reflectiveness of the mirror is displaced to the element which holds it upright; stainless steel plates make a shape which could be identified as eye or mouth, or, if the upright 'mirror' is phallic, its female counterpart. The displacement in this work would seem to reverse the original substitution which takes place during childhood when a relation with the world based on touch is replaced with a relation based on vision: for the lost part-object is substituted a narcissistic, idealized image of the ego as an externalized mirror-reflection of the body as a bounded whole.²⁵ 'Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the fairest of them all?' asks the fairy tale princess who is furious because the mirror does not lie.

The truth of the sculpture must inhere in its completeness as an object in three dimensions. The interpretation so far would only hold good of the sculpture seen from two points of view, which we could call front and back. What happens as the viewer walks around in the side is that this image disappears, leaving an edge which stresses the thickness of the mirror's 'handle' and the internal loop. It is the meaning of this disappearance at the edge of the more emblematic sculptures that I now wish to consider.

Anamorphosis is the term for the distortion of form which occurs, for example, when a circle viewed at an angle appears as an ellipse. It is also a technique in drawing and painting whereby an image is produced on a surface according to a point of view at an angle to the picture plane, so that seen from the normal point of view it appears distorted: a classic example is Holbein's painting *The Ambassadors* (1533) where the anamorphic image forms a skull, a *memento mori*, when seen from close to the edge of the picture plane, the point at which the rest of the picture, the two ambassadors with their worldly accoutrements, is about to disappear.²⁶

Anamorphosis plays a part in almost all Deacon's sculpture from the untitled works of 1980-81, where he succeeded in incorporating image-references without sacrificing the literalism he had learned from Minimal sculpture.²⁷ The literalist object is present as a phenomenon, wholly evident as surface. An image, however, stands for or in the place of an object or part of the world which is thereby absented. In introducing image into his sculpture, Deacon did so in such a way that the three-dimensionality of the object became the condition for the image's appearance, which alters anamorphically during the viewer's circumambulation. If the image appears, it also disappears. Whereas the earlier sculptures - the untitled works and most of the *Art for Other People* - tend towards a continuous succession of alternations between inside and outside, access and barrier, the more recent sculptures tend to emphasize the discontinuity between different points of view. That some of these sculptures are flat, at least in part, and the image perceived as an emblem, should not lead us to suppose that the side-view is unimportant. If image is also the means by which the viewer appropriates the sculpture through the look - the grasping of the image is its incorporation into consciousness - then the side-view involves the loss of the sculpture-as-image to the viewer's consciousness, and the reassertion of its otherness. The first sculpture to deal explicitly with the implications of front and side views as the 'face' and 'profile' of a figure is *Out of the House*. Like some of the *Art for Other People* sculptures, it combines two materials, in this case linoleum and steel. The steel is used to give rigidity to the structure, like the exterior skeleton of a crustacean, while the lino gives body, with the light brown patterned side forming the face and the textured red underside the back, punctuated with the silver of the rivets joining it to the steel.

The outline of the body, seen front-on, suggests the contour of a vase, or a female body with a pinched waist. From the seat protrude three undulating 'legs', one of which is raised into the air. The wavy curves connote something organic and in motion, like an octopus, while the raised leg suggests a huge phallus, the title adding to this suggestion of rudeness beyond the normal domestic boundaries. Although it is necessary to cut up the sculpture for the purpose of description, in actuality it coheres into a 'body'; we recognize the back, front and sides as views of a single entity, as we do with a person, even if there is a radical disjunction in the appearance of the sculpture from these different points of view. Each aspect evokes a different experience: aggressiveness as the 'phallus' points up towards the viewer; from behind the sculpture seems to turn its back; and a mixture of humour and pathos in silhouette where the curve defined by the edge of the sculpture appears as if attempting to contain an interior space.

Emblem and Face

In *Colour and Form* Adrian Stokes writes 'Carving creates a face for the stone, as agriculture for the earth, as man for woman. Modelling is more purely plastic creation: it makes things, it does not disclose, as a face, the significance of what

already exists.' This quotation appeared in a review of the carved bowls and boxes of the craftsman David Pye written by Richard Deacon and published in January 1978.²⁸ Deacon is not a carver; like Stokes' modeller, he makes things, but they are things which 'disclose, as a face, the significance of what already exists.'²⁹ Over the past year the emblematic aspect of his sculpture has come to the fore, so it is not surprising to learn that he has a particular interest in the sculpture of the 18th and early 19th centuries, particularly the work of Flaxman, Canova and Thorvaldsen, which combines a restrained purity of surface with the eloquence of contour. In these sculptures, which mark the point of transition from Neoclassical Idealism to the Romantic symbol, immutable surface and precision of outline serves to distil and intensify the embodiment of meanings which are not yet separated from the commonly held corpus of mythology and literature.

Sculpture has always been concerned with the pictorial, with the discrepancy between a perceived view and the tactile depth of the object. Over the last five years a number of artists have been concerned with the perception of the sculpture as image. In many cases this has involved placing the sculpture on or against a wall in order to isolate a preferred point of view. By contrast, the frontality of Deacon's sculpture is a part of its condition as a three-dimensional object where edge and back are equally important. This difference could be described as being between 'facade', a front without a back, and 'face', where the frontal view becomes analogous to seeing the face of a person. The face is where we instinctively look to see the expression from which we infer the person's 'inner feelings'. But, as I have argued, Deacon's sculpture does not allow the notion of an 'inside' from which meaning originates. What, then, is the role of the 'face' in his emblematic sculpture?

Throughout this essay I have referred to the analogy between the way in which we apprehend the sculpture and our relation to 'ordinary' things and to other people. Writing on the ethical implications of the face, Emmanuel Levinas holds that the absolute otherness of the other person, which is the basis of ethical responsibility, is something which cannot be visually or sensually apprehended like a thing: in this sense it is in-finite.³⁰ It follows that, for Levinas, this ethical dimension of the other *as a person* can never be embodied in the sensible form of a work of art: the aesthetic should not be confused with the ethical. However, I would argue that Richard Deacon's sculpture does have an ethical basis, and that it is possible to speak of our relation to the sculpture as a *metaphor* for our relation to other people, in the same way as Bernini's sculpture is a metaphor for the relation with God, since unlikeness is a prerequisite for metaphorical substitution. Previously I have associated the 'otherness' of the sculpture with its assertion of process, facticity of materials, and wholeness. Now I wish to suggest that these are not so much the locus of otherness as the limit which it is beyond: that the way in which the sculpture is in Being can only be fully understood in terms of what the sculpture, as a thing, is not. If the perception of the sculpture has been shown to be dependent upon language, language

is, in the end, a relation between people. Earlier I described how *Out of the House*, one of the most anthropomorphic of Deacon's sculptures has front and rear views like the face and back of a person. This double-sidedness is true of a number of Deacon's sculptures, but it becomes more emphatic in the emblematic sculptures. This doublesidedness raises the question of what one can or cannot predict of what one does not see. In the case of *Art for Other People* No. 9, for example, an ear-shape in galvanized steel, each side is a structural, inversion of the other; so much can be inferred from a single view, but what cannot be predicted is the effect that this inversion will have on the experience of the other side. In a way, this question of the 'other side' of the emblematic sculpture is a development from the 'inside' of the 'hollow' sculpture.

For a sculpture which is all surface, which does not contain an interior, skin can become face. A comparison of the laminated wood *Like a Bird* with its pendant, the galvanized steel *Like a Ship* points up the differences, as well as the continuities, between inferred volume and the doublesidedness of face. *Like a Bird*, originally made for an outside location, repeats a silhouette to describe a volume. It appears ready to fly in its lightness; but the reading of the schematic outline, and the contribution of an inferred 'body' is very much the viewer's share; an examination of the structure draws attention to the materiality of wood and glue, and the process of its fabrication: the sculpture may be like a bird, but it is not a bird. By contrast with the large scale of this sculpture, *Like a Ship* is much smaller, closer to the size of the *Art for Other People* sculptures. In certain circumstances, this can have the effect of increasing the apparent distance from the viewer, as a toy ship seen bobbing in a pond can appear as if in the middle of a lake. Just as the former sculpture assumed the schematic outline of a bird, like Picasso's famous dove, so the latter is the archetypal boat, with a symmetrical prow and stern curving up from the centre where the sculpture sits on the ground and then looping back to make the mast. The body of the 'ship' is filled in with a single sheet of galvanized steel, so the front and back of the sculpture are symmetrical; it is on moving to the side that the viewer discovers that the steel ribbing forming the outline is doubled, giving an unexpected thickness to the view where the sculpture loses its horizontal to become vertical. Instead of image what is most noticeable now are the steel tabs used like stitches to join the parts.

While Deacon's *Between the Two of Us* employs a construction similar to that of *Like a Ship*, it differs in the asymmetry between front and back. A spreadeagle outline is defined by an armature of steel joined with rivetted tabs. The sides of the armature act like the lip of a pot, only here they mediate not between inside and outside but between the two faces and the edge. In the lower section of the sculpture this armature is tripled and closes inwards; in the centre section it is doubled and makes an edge which opens outwards; finally, at the top, the armature is single and closes inwards again. The emblematic form carries a number of figural connotations:

a squatting figure with arms akimbo, a bird spreading its wings, or an opening flower, to name some which spring to mind. As the sculpture sits on a curved base with its arms rising upwards from the centre, it appears to ascend. This strong, evocative outline gives the sculpture a powerful presence even when seen from a very great distance, ideal for the outdoor location for which it was originally made. Moving towards and around the sculpture, the difference between the two sides becomes evident. To the centre of one side is attached a grey sack stencilled with numerals and the letters ONDON, connoting place and travel, its opening hanging limply from the 'head' of the outline like the beak-sack in which the pelican stores food for its young. On the other side a double spine of steel runs down the back of the central sheet, to which are joined continuations of the exterior ribbing from the top of the sculpture's 'limbs'. There is a contrast between the inert sack which expresses the weight of gravity, and the rising diagonals of the taut steel. The spreadeagle configuration suggests a Crucifixion, the geometric rigidity of the Cross contrasting the pathos of the mortal body. The canvas sack could be a thief's swag-bag; and Christ was crucified between two thieves. The title, *Between the Two of Us* is rich with implications: the two sides of the sculpture; the armature and the steel sheet stretched within it; between skin and bone, the body; between the two partners in a sexual encounter; a shared secret; between sculpture and viewer; face to face.³¹ The viewer is reflected on the shiny surface of the steel, the sculpture is apprehended as an image in the consciousness of the viewer; there is nearness but also distance, the otherness of the sculpture which can never be wholly known. Always another side, never the final word.

Michael Newman

1. Richard Deacon, 'Notes on a Piece of Sculpture' (see Bibliography), explores the tension between the description of a sculpture seen from different points of view and its integral wholeness as an object which is 'other'. Many of Deacon's subsequent concerns are prefigured in the description of the making of a work *Stuff Box Object* (1971/72) published by Chapter Arts Centre, Cardiff 1984. The duality of empathy and otherness

in his subsequent work is anticipated by the way in which he physically entered the box and worked on it from the inside, suggesting the metaphor of a womb, and then sealed a mannikin the same size as himself inside the box and coated the exterior with layers of plaster and other materials. This also looks forward to the way in which the sculpture was to become both a literal object and a metaphorical substitute for the person.

2. 'Questions to Stella and Judd', Interview by Bruce Glaser, edited by Lucy R. Lippard, *Art News*, Sept. 1966, reprinted in *Minimal Art: a critical anthology*, ed. Battcock, New York 1968, pp. 155, 151. Also relevant to Deacon's sculpture is Judd's comment on a work by Lee Bontecou that 'The entire piece, the structure and the

image are co-extensive', *Arts Magazine*, April 1965, reprinted in Donald Judd, *Complete Writings 1959-1975*, New York and Halifax 1975.

3. *Passages in Modern Sculpture*, chapter 7, New York 1977.

4. *What Sculpture Is*, pts. 1-8, *Studio International*, Dec. 1974-May/June 1975. See also *The Language of Sculpture*, London 1977, where he ends with an illustration of Degas' *Petite Danseuse* which could be compared for its literal use of fabric for clothing with Deacon's *On the Face of It*.

5. The origins of the term lie in the emphasis on subjectivity of Kant's *Critique of Aesthetic judgement* (1790) and the organic-pantheistic identification with Nature in Romantic theories of art; it was developed in German-language writing on aesthetics during the 19th and early 20th centuries.

6. See Yehuda Safran, '"The Object is the Poetics": Empathy and Embodiment', *AND Journal of Art*, Winter 1983/84, where empathy is discussed in relation to Phenomenology.

7. Wilhelm Worringer, *Abstraction and Empathy*, London (1908), trans. 1953, P-67.

8. Unpublished typescript. Deacon writes, '... because of the built on or added character of such we are deflected from meaning being disclosed to us as an inseparable part of our connection to a particular object and implicated within our perception of that as a whole object. With this whole object identity is retained in the face of attacks aimed at prising off areas of meaning and producing for ourselves an illustrative content. Faced with this object we are led to "look at" it ... I take the mode "looking at" to be characterised by the enabling of phenomenal (or, as previously, thematic) structures to arise. At the risk of sounding narrow, I say that my commitment to Painting and to Sculpture, as fields of possibility rather than as say history or as manual operations, lies with this enablement.'

9. *Art and its Objects*, Cambridge, 2nd ed., 1980, 'Seeing-as, seeing-in, and pictorial representation', pp. 205-226.

10. *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford 1963, p. 195.

11. See Donald A. Schon, *Displacement of Concepts*, London 1963.

12. Jacques Derrida, 'White Mythology: Metaphor in the text of philosophy', *Margins*, trans. Bass, Brighton 1982.

13. For further extracts on the drawings, see my 'Richard Deacon: Metaphor and Things', *British Sculpture Now*, Kunstmuseum Luzern 1982.

14. William Tucker discussed the relevance of Rilke's writings for sculpture in his talks at Saint Martin's School of Art and in *The Language*

15. Trans. G. Craig Houston from *Where Silence Reigns: Selected Prose by Rainer Maria Rilke*, New York 1978.

15. The notebooks contain freehand drawings of pots, and Deacon initially tried making sculpture out of clay in the form of pots. For his own discussion of the formal and ontological issues involved, see his introduction to the catalogue *Jacqui Poncelet: New Ceramics*, Crafts Council, London 1981.
16. For Heidegger's interpretation of Rilke's use of the term 'the Open', see 'What Are Poets For?' in Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Hofstadter, New York 1975.
17. See Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, London 1954, pp. 279-309. These mechanisms are related to the rhetorical figures of metaphor and metonymy, for the use of which in recent British sculpture see my introduction to *Figures and Objects*, John Hansard Gallery, Southampton 1983.
18. See my essays in *British Sculpture Now* and 'New Sculpture in Britain', *Art in America*, Sept. 1982.
19. For a discussion of this sculpture in relation to Heidegger's essay on *The Thing* (in *Poetry, Language, Thought*) see *British Sculpture Now*.
21. *On the way to language*, trans. Hertz, New York 1982, p. 99. zz. Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, trans. Sheridan, Middlesex 1979, pp. 67-119.
23. Arturo Schwarz, *The Complete Works of Marcel Duchamp*, New York 1970, pp. 556-562. For Lacan the gaze symbolizes the 'central lack expressed on the phenomenon of castration', *The Four Fundamental Concepts*, p. 77.
24. *Jacqui Poncelet: New Ceramics*, p. 14.
25. I am referring here to Lacan's theory of the 'Mirror-stage', see *Ecrits*, trans. Sheridan, London 1977.
26. Lacan uses this painting in his seminar 'Anamorphosis', *The Four Fundamental Concepts*, pp. 79-90. See also Rosalind Krauss' introduction to *Eva Hesse: Sculpture*, Whitechapel Gallery, London 1979, where she writes concerning the sculpture *Contingent* (1969) that 'The most powerful and continuous element of Eva Hesse's work comes from the way it concentrates on the condition of edge ... In the language of anamorphosis, we could say we are positioned at the edge from which the meaning of death is understood literally as the condition of the world's disappearing from view'.
27. For a discussion of Deacon's sculpture *Boys and Girls* (1982) in terms of the ellipse, see Lynne Cooke's essay in *Richard Deacon: Sculpture*, Orchard Gallery, Londonderry 1983, and her 'Taking Shape' in *Trans-formations: New Sculpture from Britain*, The British Council, 1983-84.
28. In *Artscribe* magazine.

Adrian Stokes writes of the way 15th century Renaissance sculptors 'made stone to bloom' reflecting the 'southern compulsion to throw life outward, to objectify*. This externalization of surface as 'blossom' is identified with the emblematic tendency.

The Quattro Cento in *The Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, ed. Gowing, Vol. 1, pp. 34, 40, 145. Deacon's sculpture *Art for Other People No. 10*, completed summer 1984, comprises a galvanized steel hollow with the undulating

29.curved outline of a flower sunk into a circle of the fabric underside of lino. This bowl-flower is supported at an angle to the floor by a steel element which bisects the centre. It is as if Deacon makes steel 'bloom' by providing it with a 'face'.

30.*Totality and Infinity*, trans. Lingis, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh 1969.

31.'The Face to Face' is Levinas' term for the irreducible ethical relation. 'To have the idea of Infinity it is necessary to exist as separated*', he writes, '. . . the idea of Infinity is transcendence itself, the overflowing of an adequate idea. If totality can not be constituted it is because Infinity does not permit itself to be integrated. It is not the insufficiency of the I that prevents totalization, but the Infinity of the Other . . . The face to face remains an ultimate situation.' *Totality and Infinity*, pp. 79-81. He is referring, of course, to the Other as a person.